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Options for reform of Commonwealth and State 
governance responsibilities for the Australian 
health system 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide advice on options for governance reform of 
Commonwealth-state responsibilities for the Australian health system, for consideration by the 
NHHRC. The service design and governance principles published by the Commission in 
Beyond the Blame Game, along with the concept of single accountability, have been used as 
a framework for our thinking.  
The task 
We were asked to address two main questions: 
• What are the options for change in governance structures and processes that would 
enable single accountability for major elements of the health system? The options 
should be shaped with regard to the Commission’s service design and governance 
principles, and with the allocations of accountability proposed in the Commission’s 
first paper, but not limited to them.  
• How might the performance of the five major governance or stewardship functions – 
funding, ownership, purchasing, provision and regulation – be strengthened as the 
system moves towards single accountability? 
The task is to address the governance of the health system as a whole (and as defined 
above, also major structural design elements including arrangements for purchasing and 
provision of health care). Good governance is required at all levels (specific types of health 
services, facilities, regions and so on) but this paper addresses other levels only in relation to 
system governance.   
In addressing questions about system governance, we were also asked to consider the set of 
more technical issues included as Attachment 1. 
Some important terms defined 
Governance for present purposes is defined 
as the structures and processes by which 
the health system is regulated, directed and 
controlled. It includes the obligations of 
stewardship – ensuring that the system is 
well sustained for the future as well as 
serving the needs of the present. 
Governance is done by the people in charge 
– their authority is matched with 
accountability. Governance in a large 
complex system happens at several levels.  
The importance and limits of health system 
governance 
Good governance of the health system is necessary. But it 
alone will not solve the major problems confronting the 
health system. Effective governance removes barriers, 
gives permissions, sets directions, better allocates 
resources and enables change.  It does not solve patient 
care problems, but it can create the conditions under which 
problems become solvable.  
As noted above, this paper focuses on governance at system level, with less attention to 
governance at health care delivery level, and it does not address governance within the 
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private sector. However, we do briefly address the role of the private sector in relation to the 
major system-level functions, and in particular purchasing and provision of health care. 
Health system is used to include health and aged care (because these are the two major 
sectors of the system in and between which split responsibility causes great problems – see 
below). There are other more difficult questions of scope (how much disability care should be 
included? What about other human services?) that we address towards the end of this paper.  
Purchasing and commissioning are terms that refer to active decision-making by funders 
about what health care should be ‘purchased’ on behalf of consumers, how and from whom 
(Harding and Preker 2000). This method has developed as an alternative to simply paying 
providers for what they traditionally do (hospital care, mental health care etc). A purchasing 
approach requires clear separation of the roles of funding and providing health care, and can 
be applied regardless of the mix of public and private ownership and funding within a health 
system. The World Health Organisation has argued that strategic purchasing should be 
considered as a major option for improving the performance of health systems, because it can 
support resource shifts across care boundaries to achieve effective interventions, as well as 
reducing ‘administrative rigidities generated by hierarchically structured command-and-control 
models’ in publicly operating systems. Purchasing can also create incentives for provider 
responsiveness and efficiency, and promote decentralisation of health service management 
(Figueres et al, 2005:4). While there are some circumstances where purchasing is undertaken 
on a competitive basis, this is not often the best approach in health care. The term 
‘commissioning’ is used in this paper to distinguish it from commercial purchasing in the 
market place. Purchasing/commissioning decisions are translated into contracts with health 
care providers, not into commercial sales. 
Corporatisation is defined as the restructuring of public health services into public sector or 
not for profit non-government corporations.  Management decision making is decentralised to 
the hospital/health service Board of Directors. Internationally, corporatisation reforms have 
been undertaken in countries such as Canada, the UK and New Zealand in an attempt to 
‘mimic the structure and efficiency of private corporations while assuring that social objectives 
are still emphasized through public ownership’ (Harding 2000:15).  
Single accountability in this paper means that one level of government is held to account for 
the performance of particular parts of the health system, or the whole health system (within 
the boundaries of government roles). Single accountability can be achieved by structural 
reform so that only one level of government has a role; or it can be achieved through financial 
and other incentives and penalties that give government incentives to ensure performance. 
For example, the Commonwealth and the states could agree that the Commonwealth would 
pay the states directly for every public hospital day of stay by someone who would not be in 
hospital if (Commonwealth-funded) residential or step-down or home-based care were 
available. The Commonwealth would therefore have a strong incentive to ensure access to 
the right kind of care when needed (because acute care is more expensive).  
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Our approach 
In a vigorous public debate about the future of the health care system, there have been many 
different prescriptions for change in structures and governance – Commonwealth take over, 
local boards, funds pooling, managed care, population health funding, Medicare Gold, 
privatisation of health care delivery, and so on. It seems that everyone agrees change is 
needed, but there is no consensus on the direction of change. Or if there is – for example, 
everyone seems to agree that the split of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and 
the states1 is dysfunctional – agreement breaks down at that point.  
The prescriptions seem to go nowhere. So far, there has been a sense that the vested 
interests of so many different stakeholders have created policy gridlock – every possible 
direction of change is blocked by the interests of one important group or another (including 
the interests of government health authorities themselves). There also seems to be 
disagreement or confusion about the role of governance structures and processes – what 
governance arrangements can and can’t do. 
In this context, we have concluded that the most useful approach we can take is to start by 
defining the problems the system needs to address, and articulating the design features that 
are desirable to enable those problems to be solved or ameliorated. In this way, we seek to 
make clear the logical links between goals and options. Accordingly in what follows we make 
explicit the logic of our analysis, and the layering of governance structures and processes, in 
a way that is designed to identify the pathways governments and the health system could 
take. In keeping with the Commission’s terms of reference, we have focused on the role of 
governments as the major decision-makers for the health system, while not ignoring the 
private sector. 
This short paper is necessarily schematic in its analysis of design options. Its purpose is to 
clarify the choices that can be made.  Once a choice is made, much more detailed work will 
be required to translate the preferred option into a national implementation plan.  
There are many important areas of care that are not specifically addressed. For example, we 
have not said anything about the current problems with dental care, or those facing younger 
people with disabilities who need residential care. Neither have we properly addressed the 
activities known (somewhat confusingly) as public health – primary prevention of illness and 
injury, healthy public policy and related roles. They are currently shared among all of the main 
players, for good reasons – policy and action are required at national, state, regional and local 
level on different aspects. This critical function falls both within and outside of the health 
system. 
We begin with a consideration of the major problems we are seeking to address and the 
related design principles. We then outline a decision pathway by which options can be 
constructed and ultimately chosen.  Four possible options are outlined, along with some 
common features that we suggest could be part of all options. We conclude with some 
suggestions about required next steps. 
                                                     
1 We use ‘state’ to mean both state and territory jurisdictions. 
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What problems are we solving? 
Table 1 below summarises some major current roles in relation to the five governance 
functions. This is not meant to be comprehensive (and excludes, for example, the roles of 
professional boards and learned colleges) but is simply designed to illustrate the complexity in 
current governance arrangements. 
Table 1: Current location of main governance functions 
Function Commonwealth States/Territories Private/NGO sector 
Ownership  Public hospitals, community & 
public health 
Private hospitals and Aged 
Care Facilities, private 
practices 
Funding Residential and some 
community aged care, 
MBS, PBS, DVA, State 
grants, Indigenous PHC, 
30% rebate on insurance 
Public hospitals, community & 
public health, ambulance, some 
public dental services, accident 
compensation and disability 
care 
Health insurance, accident 
insurance 
Commiss- 
ioning  
Limited - DVA and some 
NGO community care 
Varies - some hospital and NGO 
services 
Limited - some insurers 
Provision  Australian Hearing, 
C'wealth Rehab Service, 
Health Services Aust. 
Public hospitals, community & 
public health, ambulance 
Private hospitals and 
RACFs, private practices 
Regulation Residential aged care, 
food standards, health 
insurance  
Public and private hospitals, 
community & public health, 
workforce 
 
 
Even with this complexity, there is much in the Australian health system that works well, 
including in its governance. However, based on our analysis of current debates and our own 
observation of dysfunctional arrangements in the health system, we suggest that there are 
nine main problems that any system-level changes should address. They are at two levels – 
the problems that directly affect access to effective care for patients; and the problems that 
directly affect the performance of the system. 
 
Problems for patients 
1. There is inequitable access to services, shaped by place (especially remote and rural 
location) and financial barriers to care, among other factors.  This is particularly the case for 
those services funded under fee for service arrangements.  While the health care you receive 
should be based on your need, where you live and how much money you have too often 
determines what you actually receive and how quickly you receive it. 
2. Services are fragmented for those who require ongoing care for complex and 
chronic conditions. While the current arrangements work reasonably well for those of us 
who have only occasional or episodic health problems, they are not well designed to respond 
to the needs that some of us have for coordinated, ongoing care. 
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3. The primary health care sector is 
fragmented and not well developed. 
This problem most affects those who 
need ongoing care for chronic 
conditions, and those in remote and 
rural areas. But it also applies more 
generally – for example, depending on 
where you live, you may or may not 
receive automatic access to support and 
advice as a new mother.  Finally, there 
is too little effort in prevention of illness 
and injury, a potentially important 
function of the primary health care 
system. 
Leutz’s Laws of Service Integration 
Based on a comparative UK:USA study, Leutz 
developed 6 principles to guide integration of health 
and community care: 
1. You can integrate some of the services for all the 
people, and all the services for some of the people, but 
you can’t integrate all of the services for all of the 
people. 
2. Integration costs before it pays. 
3. Your integration is my fragmentation. 
4. You can’t integrate a square peg and a round hole. 
5. The one who integrates calls the tune. 
6. All integration is local. 
Source: Leutz (1999, 2005). 
 
Problems of system design 
4. There is a bewildering array of funding programs, each with its own eligibility criteria, 
accountability requirements, timelines and access barriers. Even experienced managers and 
clinicians find it hard to be sure their services are getting the funding they’re eligible for. 
Duplication and gaps are the norm. Funding complexity spawns regulatory and reporting 
complexity – witness the complicated requirements for GPs, and the overhead costs of 
administering ‘vertical’ population health programs. 
5. Blame- and cost - shifting between levels of government is a major barrier to 
improvement in the system of care. This problem has been addressed in the Commission’s 
first paper. The current split of responsibilities sets up perverse financial incentives for 
governments, whereby one level can ‘win’ financially through measures that cause the other 
level to ‘lose’ financially. The impact on patients and care providers is significant, in the form 
of unnecessarily fragmented and complex referral and care pathways. But cost shifting is also 
highly inefficient – witness the number of state funded hospital beds that are occupied every 
day by patients who cannot access Commonwealth funded residential or transition care when 
they need it. The resultant blame-shifting (the policies and structures that enable finger-
pointing and work against problem-solving) creates an additional barrier to performance 
improvement. 
6. The workforce is pressured, jobs are less satisfying, we face serious supply 
problems and skills are not best utilised. While we have shortages now, the current 
workforce is ageing, and future shortages are predicted to be severe. The jobs offered to 
skilled staff tend to be defined in ways that were perhaps appropriate 30 years ago but are 
not optimal for current and future health care models. 
7. The relationship between government, non-government and private services is 
suboptimal and contentious. Reflecting the bewildering array of funding programs, there is 
a bewildering array of public, private and non-government health care providers, delivering 
only some of what a consumer requires and lacking effective linkages to other agencies and 
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care options.  Relationships between health agencies are too often dependent on personal 
relationships rather than transparent communication and referral systems.  Coordinated 
planning of the government, non-government and private sectors is the exception rather than 
the norm.  
8. Decision-making is too removed from front line service delivery.  In the public sector 
in recent years, operational decision-making has become more centralised, with many layers 
between those at the front line and those who hold decision-making authority. At the moment, 
all state health authorities (with the partial exception of Victoria) have centralised governance 
to state level. Many are operating at a larger size with less delegation of operational decision-
making than would be seen to be feasible in the private sector or in other public systems. 
Further, there are inherent conflicts of interest with health departments being expected to 
exercise their Westminster responsibilities of serving the government of the day while at the 
same time carrying operational responsibility for health service delivery.  
9. It is too difficult to introduce and sustain new models of care and other innovation. 
While the policy debate goes on, and all the problems listed above take their toll, providers 
and policy workers in all sectors continue to experiment, redesign and seek to improve 
services. But change is very hard to make, and even harder to sustain. The jungle of funding 
rules, split responsibilities, laser-like targeting of eligibility criteria and professional role 
demarcations generally seem to overgrow a new model of care once the project funding and 
energy are exhausted. Change is too often lost and too seldom replicated. Similarly, the 
money and effort expended to get IT systems that can deliver needed information at the right 
place and the right time seems out of all proportion with the modest results.  
 
What would better governance and system design mean for patients? 
Structures and policies at system level can seem very remote from the problems that patients 
and care providers in all sectors would like to see resolved. To illustrate the ways in which 
changes in governance could affect access and the quality of care as well as the roles of 
health care providers, we outline some typical patient care problems, and then explain what 
could be different if the split in the responsibilities of government were resolved and equitable 
funding were available. We introduce here some arrangements that are explained later in this 
paper. 
Table 2: Some patient care problems that could be resolved under new 
arrangements 
Patient Care Problem Potential improvement 
Patient in a remote area: 
Your small community 
doesn’t have a GP. The 
Commonwealth 
Department of Health and 
Ageing cannot assist. 
An alternative method of providing access to GP care is organised by 
your health funding authority (which allocates public health funding for 
your region), by contracting with a medical organisation that employs 
GPs for this purpose. [This is already happening in some remote areas 
through special arrangements]. This arrangement can’t alone solve the 
shortage of GPs, but it can influence redistribution. Alternatively, a 
different set of financial incentives for the Commonwealth could mean 
that the Commonwealth is more actively engaged in setting incentives for 
GPs to work in small remote communities where fee-for-service is an 
inadequate method of payment. 
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Patient Care Problem Potential improvement 
General Practitioner: Your 
elderly patient who til now 
has been coping at home 
attends on a Friday 
afternoon clearly too frail 
and confused to be safe 
over the weekend at home 
alone. In desperation, you 
send him to the local 
hospital emergency 
department, knowing they’ll 
have to keep him safe at 
least til Monday. 
Your practice nurse is now able to seek emergency access to transition 
care in a nearby aged care facility for your patient, where he will be cared 
for over the weekend, and assessed as to his need for home-based 
support or accommodation in residential care. Home-based support 
services are organised a week later, and your patient is discharged home 
on the following Monday, with both formal carers and family support 
organised. You are involved in formulating his care plan, including 
adjustments to his medications, and you are notified at least 24 hours in 
advance of his transfer home. You have access to the clinical pharmacist 
from the transition care facility to help you to monitor what are likely to be 
ongoing changes in medication needs. This happy outcome is made 
possible because the regional funding authority has decided to invest in 
transition care for precisely this sort of situation, and can afford it 
because there are enough avoided hospital admissions to make a 
difference.  
Diabetes educator: Your 
community health-based 
diabetes education program 
should be available to all 
newly diagnosed patients in 
your catchment area, but 
you are the only staff 
member who can do this 
work and you can only get 
to 40% of those who need 
your program. 
Your local primary care network (involving community health, general 
practice, representatives of local private allied health and diagnostic 
practices, medical and nursing specialists from the local hospital, two 
community representatives and a planner from the regional funding 
authority) identifies better management of diabetic patients as one of 
three main priorities in this year’s plan. The planner undertakes to 
conduct an analysis of the benefits and costs of making diabetes 
education available to all, and a working group prepares a care proposal 
to guide this work. If the analysis shows a net benefit, the RFA will 
seriously seek to respond, because even though there will be an upfront 
additional cost, the savings over time from better diabetes management 
will accrue to the RFA’s commissioning budget. 
Patient with a serious 
chronic condition 
requiring coordinated 
care: Even though you 
have a GP who does her 
best, you can’t get the 
services you need when 
you need them, because of 
barriers between private 
and public, Commonwealth- 
and state- funded services, 
and rationing of some 
services.  
You are assessed and enrolled in a special program for people with 
chronic conditions, and your GP arranges for a care coordinator (in the 
private or public sector) to be contracted to organise your care, drawing 
on all the resources available. You pay less for medicines, your GP has 
better access to your various specialists for advice and coordination and 
the care coordinator arranges payment for all the allied health and home 
care services you require, whether in the private or public sector.  Your 
care coordinator works with your GP and medical specialists to plan for 
your continuing care needs and ensure that everything that helps people 
with your condition to stay as well as possible for as long as possible is 
available. This includes making sure that you (and your family or carers) 
have the information and support you need to take good care of yourself 
and to have a good quality of life. 
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How can we get there from here? 
We have taken the nine problems outlined above as the challenge that any options for 
change in governance structures and functions should address. Good governance can’t alone 
solve most of them. For example, good governance won’t of itself solve workforce problems, 
but it might make jobs for health professionals more satisfying, and enhance their ability to 
improve care. Good governance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improvement - 
it can remove barriers, give permissions, set directions, better allocate resources and enable 
change.  
The Commission in its first paper focused on accountability by governments to the community 
and suggested an allocation of accountability for parts of the health system that largely 
matches the current funding responsibilities. The allocations proposed are shown in Table 2. 
The Commission’s proposal that the nominated level of government accept accountability for 
the relevant sectors without the matching authority is an expedient but we think unsustainable 
arrangement, requiring the development and maintenance of sophisticated monitoring and 
financial incentive systems. As the Commission acknowledged, the other problem is that it is 
technically difficult to separate some of the identified sectors.  For example, how can 
responsibility for maternal and child health not be part of primary care?  And how can mental 
health be separated from community health?  While the Commission’s proposals would no 
doubt solve some problems, others would inevitably be created and new blame- and cost-
shifting possibilities would be opened up. This is consistent with Leutz’s third law – ‘Your 
integration is my fragmentation’ (Leutz 1999:91).  
Table 3: NHHRC proposals for single accountability, April 2008 
Sector of health system Level of government suggested by the 
Commission in its 1st report 
Primary health care (including GPs and community health) Commonwealth 
Public hospitals State 
Mental health State 
Maternal and child health State 
Public health  State 
Aged care Commonwealth 
Illness prevention Commonwealth 
 
On the other hand, major structural change is always painful and expensive, and usually 
requires several years of transition and re-development before benefits are realised. 
However, there is an opportunity now to focus on a long term vision for the health system of 
the future, that could enable Australia to meet the challenges the health system faces over 
the next twenty years and more. We note that Australia is not alone in this. All OECD 
countries are grappling with the challenge of ageing populations and increasing burden of 
chronic disease for which current health funding and delivery structures are not well suited. A 
key question in the Australian context is whether the translation of such a vision into reality 
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Three fundamental questions 
1. If we maintain the split of responsibility between the 
Commonwealth and the States/Territories will it be possible to 
address the big problems that will face the Australian health care 
system of the future? 
2. Is it possible to address the problems of split responsibility 
without structural change in accountability (ie the allocation of 
authority over funding, regulation, performance)? 
3. Who should be held accountable for health system 
performance, and by extension, who should be responsible for 
funding health and aged care delivery? 
will be possible without more 
fundamental structural reform of our 
health and aged care systems.  
A longer term view 
While the Commission’s proposals in its 
first report will help in the shorter-term, 
more fundamental reform will be 
required for the future.  The nature and 
scope of this reform should be shaped 
by the response to three fundamental 
questions.  The first logical question is 
this: 
1. Can the nine problems listed above be addressed without ending blame-shifting, or 
to put it in governance terms, without resolving split responsibility? 
We suggest that the answer to this question is no, and we support this conclusion with the 
evidence of both Commonwealth and state-based attempts at reform in recent years. As 
previously reported (see, for example, Rix et al 2005 and Dwyer 2004) recent reviews and 
restructures in every Australian state can be read as attempts to address these very problems 
in the absence of a solution to split responsibility. While many good ideas have been 
formulated, and much good innovation work has been done, the fundamental problems 
remain.  
Our conclusion is that any attempt at long-term serious reform of the Australian health system 
must tackle the fundamental problems that arise from the split of responsibility between state 
and federal governments, including the resultant split between policy and funding for ‘health’ 
and ‘aged care’.   
The second big question then is this: 
2. Can the problems of split responsibility be addressed without structural change in 
accountability (ie the allocation of authority over funding, regulation and 
performance)? 
We suggest that the answer to this question is probably not or, at least, not for long. But there 
are some significant improvements that could be made in what we call the ‘renovation option’, 
which we outline later in this paper. 
If we then pursue the options for bringing government health care accountability under one 
umbrella, the next logical question is: 
3. Who should be held accountable for the performance of the Australian health 
system, and with it, be responsible for system-level governance and funding of health 
and aged care delivery? 
While all entities within the health and aged care systems need to take responsibility and be 
accountable for their performance, at government level there are three logical options, the 
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Commonwealth, the states, or separate bodies which we call Joint Health Commission/s 
(JHC’s).2 
We have developed each of these options in this paper. In doing so, we first applied some 
design principles.  
Six Design Principles  
The six design principles we have adopted are: 
1. Only fix what’s broken 
Change is expensive (though hopefully less so than no change) and disruptive. Changes 
should be considered by exception, or on the margin. That is, we assume that everything not 
explicitly changed in the options outlined below continues as it is, at least until those 
responsible under new arrangements make alternative decisions. This principle is necessary 
when the project is to change a large complex system while it continues to operate 24/7/365. 
It includes a starting position that the benefits of existing efficient arrangements (such as 
Medicare Australia’s role in processing payments to providers of care) should be retained. 
2. Enact national leadership  
The community’s strong expectation of national leadership and some consistency across the 
country should be honoured through a capacity for national policy making, continuation of 
some existing national arrangements (and the creation of some new ones), and through the 
establishment of a national health charter (or statement of health care entitlement - see the 
section on common features later in this paper) which would underpin ‘people and family 
centred care’ (NHHRC, 2008, p 36).  
3. The system must be designed as a system, with coherent roles, authorities and 
accountabilities 
The design of national health systems is not a problem with a single right answer. There are 
many combinations of governance and other design elements that can work in different 
cultures, geographies and populations. The challenge for Australia at this time is to find a 
coherent set of arrangements that will work for us, building on the strengths of what we have 
now, our established preferences (including the principles of universal access and choice), 
and an awareness of the future challenges the system will face. 
4. Maintain the universality of Medicare 
A key strength of the Australian health care system is Medicare and the entitlement that all 
Australians have to the medical and pharmaceutical benefits it provides. In accordance with 
the Commission’s terms of reference, Australia’s national Medicare system needs to be 
maintained and potentially strengthened. 
5. All service integration is local 
While it is clear that people with complex and chronic conditions need better coordination than 
is supported by current system arrangements, it is also true that service integration is neither 
necessary nor economic for other kinds of needs, and won’t be comprehensive. We therefore 
                                                     
2 The concept of Joint Health Commissions is largely based on the work of John Menadue.  See, for example, 
http://cpd.org.au/article/health-coalition-of-the-willing  
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accept Leutz’s sixth law of service integration, which is that integration has to be implemented 
locally to suit local needs and conditions (Leutz, 2005:9). The corollary is that larger policies 
should facilitate rather than dictate the shape and speed of change of local arrangements.  A 
further corollary is that coordinated regional health planning is essential. 
6. Accountability for funding and commissioning health and aged care is just as 
important as accountability for providing health and aged care 
The functions of commissioning and providing health care should be clearly delineated, in 
order to enable accountability for both commissioning decisions and good care delivery.  
The ‘purchaser-provider split’ has a chequered history in health care. Experiments in 
complete separation of these roles, notably in New Zealand in the 1990s, have not achieved 
the stated goals (Ashton et al, 2005). It can also be difficult for purchasers or commissioners 
to get the incentives right because small movements in definition or price can have large 
effects on delivery. Further, providers hold many of the skills, have a wide knowledge base 
and have the local background knowledge needed for wise commissioning decisions.   
However, active commissioning has proven important in some aspects of reform of care 
delivery, for example in mental health care, where government health authorities have acted 
as commissioners, defining models of care and awarding contracts to a new range of 
providers. Conversely, some role separation enables providers to focus more closely on 
leading and directing the operations they are responsible for.  
We suggest that commissioning may be more important when health care delivery is being 
reformed; and that while the system may benefit from a range of approaches to 
commissioning for different purposes, attention to the commissioning function is critical in 
system design.      
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Options for the governance and financing of 
Australia’s future health care system 
 
The options described in this section flow logically from different answers to the reform 
questions we posed above. While there are more complex options to be considered in 
detailed system design, and some common features, the schematic decision pathway shown 
in Figure 1 identifies the high level choices that define the options that follow. 
Figure 1 Decision pathway 
DECISION
Can the problems of split
responsibility be addressed
without structural change?
No
DECISION
Commonwealth assumes
responsibility for the
governance and financing of the
whole Australian health system?
Yes
OPTION 1
Commonwealth
See Table 4
DECISION
Will the Commonwealth need regional
HFAs, at least in the larger states, to
plan and commission services?
No
Option 1a
Yes
Option 1b
No
DECISION
Pool Commonwealth and
State/Territory health funding
into one funding pool?
Yes
DECISION
Who should hold and
manage health funding?
OPTION 2
States/Territories
See Table 5
DECISION
Will the States and Territories, at
least the larger ones, need
regional HFAs to plan and
commission services?
No
Option 2a
Yes
Option 2b
OPTION 3
Joint Commonwealth/State
Health Commissions (CSHC)
See Table 6
DECISION
Will the CSHCs need regional
HFAs, at least in the larger
states, to plan and commission
services?
No
Option 3a
Yes
Option 3b
Yes
OPTION 4
Renovate
DECISION
What parts of the system can be
renovated to solve at least some
of these problems?
See Table 7
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Option 1: Commonwealth takes responsibility 
In this option, the Commonwealth takes responsibility for the governance of the entire health 
and aged care system and its public funding, and with it, clear accountability to the Australian 
people for overall performance of the health system. Fiscal arrangements between the 
Commonwealth and the States and Territories are re-balanced, so that all funding for public 
health and aged care functions is retained/recouped by the Commonwealth.  
The Commonwealth is the sole funder of the public system.  This means that it alone is 
accountable to the public for the amount of public funding spent on health care and for how 
that money is spent. Its role in relation to the private system (such as private services funded 
by MBS or PBS and Private Health Insurance) remains as is. In addition to its traditional role, 
the Commonwealth is responsible for commissioning public health services. The combination 
of responsibility for funding and/or regulating both public and private delivery will provide 
opportunities for the Commonwealth to develop programs that better coordinate or integrate 
patient care across these sectors. 
Providers continue with current ownership arrangements – state, NGO, local government or 
private sector.  The Commonwealth is free to commission health and aged care from any 
sector. 
Table 4: Governance functions in the Commonwealth option 
Functions Commonwealth States Private/NGO 
Funding Yes. Maintenance of the 
current functions of 
Medicare Australia – plus 
contract services from a 
range of providers 
No As is 
Ownership No – as is As is or corporatise As is 
Commissioning Yes No As is 
Provision As is As is or vacate As is or contracted 
Regulation Most Residual statutory 
responsibilities, reduce over 
time 
Contracted out as 
expedient 
Other issues While the Commonwealth has considerable expertise in managing fee for service 
reimbursement schemes, it has little experience in funding or managing other 
health care. Nor does it have expertise in equity-based population planning. The 
new role of the Commonwealth is not compatible with current DoHA culture or 
expertise.  Significant change would be required within DoHA, particularly if it were 
to retain commissioning functions internally (see below). 
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There are two sub-options under the Commonwealth model.   
Option 1(a) – the Commonwealth plans and commissions all health and aged care 
services   
Under this option, the policy, planning and monitoring functions of the states transfer to the 
Commonwealth and these functions are undertaken by the Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Ageing (DoHA) through its Canberra and regional (capital city) offices. 
Option 1(b) - the Commonwealth establishes regional Health Funding Authorities 
(HFAs)  
Under Option 1(b) the Commonwealth establishes HFAs to undertake the commissioning 
function, on the basis that it could not sensibly be done from Canberra or through the capital 
city offices as currently structured. Regions might be whole states (in Tasmania, Northern 
Territory, ACT and perhaps South Australia), or might cross state boundaries (eg a 
commissioning authority for Northern Australia, across far north Queensland, the Top End of 
NT and northern WA).  
There are two further sub-options for the structure of the HFAs.  The first is that the HFA is a 
Commonwealth agency that is part of DoHA.  The second is that the HFA is established as a 
health portfolio agency separate from DoHA, under the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act (FMA) 1997.  If under the FMA, HFAs would be accountable to the Minister 
but with a level of independence equivalent to that of other FMA agencies such as Cancer 
Australia, the NHMRC and the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman. This latter 
arrangement seems more appropriate given the role of the HFA to make commissioning 
decisions on behalf of the regional/state population. 
Either way, the HFA structure will be better placed to balance provider and population 
interests, both geographically and in terms of population sub-groups. The size will need to be 
sufficiently large to manage and spread risks as well as small enough to allow for population 
planning and informed commissioning.  
The regional HFAs plan, commission, fund and regulate health care providers in their region 
(within national standards, policies and budgets) on behalf of the Commonwealth.  Thus the 
policy function of the states transfers to DoHA but the planning, commissioning and 
monitoring functions transfer to Commonwealth HFAs. 
HFAs are allocated a population needs-adjusted share of health funding.  They are 
accountable for health care for the regional population. They commission the full range of 
services from prevention to palliation to improve and maintain the health of the regional 
population. This includes responsibility for building coordination and integration of local health 
services. Attachment 2 outlines one aspect of population based funding, modelling the impact 
of equitable distribution of MBS funding. 
These responsibilities imply the skill mix that will be required, much of which currently resides 
in state health departments and in existing regional and area health services. Regardless of 
whether Option 1(a) or Option 1(b) is selected, the commissioning body will require staff with 
expertise in health needs analysis, health planning and contracting. This includes expertise in 
building relationships and fostering the integration of local health services.  
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Medicare Australia continues to act as the transaction agent for MBS and PBS services, 
along with any additional payment roles the Commonwealth may allocate. The national MBS 
is retained but could be expanded over time to incorporate other types of payments. 
HFAs negotiate contracts for health care provision with local service providers (public or 
private sector), addressing efficiency and volume risks. While the majority of funding is on the 
basis of outputs (eg casemix, MBS), contracts could also be on the basis of population-
covered (eg health promotion) or funding-for-capacity (eg regional epidemiological 
surveillance). 
A key difference between Option 1(a) and Option 1(b) is in the flow of funding.  In Option 1(a) 
funding flows from the Commonwealth directly to providers either as retrospective payments 
for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or as prospective contracts.  In Option 1(b) each 
region receives a population needs-adjusted share of funding. The HFA then uses its regional 
funding allocation to pay for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or to fund prospective 
contracts. In both Options 1(a) and 1(b) the responsibility for commissioning is separate from 
ownership and delivery. 
States may choose to continue to manage 
their health services and hospitals, providing 
services as purchased by the 
Commonwealth.  Alternately, they could 
corporatise their hospitals and health 
services along Canadian lines (ie through 
community or University-type ownership 
arrangements) such as is already the case 
for faith-based ‘public’ hospitals in several 
Australian states. These corporations might 
be individual health care facilities or 
networks of facilities. This would effectively 
turn public health services into not for profit 
non-government agencies, similar to 
Foundation Trusts in the UK.  States could, 
of course, choose a combination of these 
two strategies. State health authorities 
would also retain some roles in accordance 
with statutory responsibilities (eg disaster 
coordination, public health emergency 
responses). 
The UK Model: Foundation Trusts 
In England, hospitals and related services are organised as 
Trusts, similar to area health services. Trusts can apply to 
become Foundation Trusts which are independent legal entities 
called Public Benefit Corporations. Foundation Trusts are free 
from central government and local health authority control but 
continue to deliver services to their local populations, as 
purchased by Primary Health Care Trusts and subject to national 
standards. 
Foundation Trusts have more freedom to develop local solutions 
to health problems, including setting up partnerships with other 
health providers. Local residents and patients can become 
“members” of the Trust. Members can serve on the Trust Board 
of Governors along with representatives of staff and other 
stakeholders. Non executive directors on the Trust Board of 
Directors are appointed .from amongst the Board of Governors.  
The government maintains reserve powers including step in 
rights. The public assets involved are protected by prohibitions 
on demutualisation or privatisation. 
Source: UK Dept of Health, 2005 
The question arises as to whether commissioning as well as service provision could be 
contracted to non-government organisations (including private health insurers). This is an 
available option, and is canvassed in a separate commissioned paper on ‘A Mixed 
Public:Private System for 2020’. This option may be appropriate for example, for people with 
chronic and complex conditions who are assessed as requiring enhanced access to care and 
coordination. This would be a decision to be made by the Commonwealth, or by individual 
HFAs. Current risk adjustment technologies are not sufficiently robust to allow governments to 
contract out purchasing of all public care for partial populations (eg those with private health 
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insurance) because cost risk cannot be estimated reliably in advance. The exception outlined 
above is a population in which risk and likely costs have already been individually clinically 
assessed. Alternatively, it may be feasible to contract out purchasing for particular health 
programs for entire regional populations, but only if it were possible to avoid creating new 
cost- and blame-shifting opportunities at regional level. 
 
Health Funding Authorities 
In each of the three options for major structural reform, we suggest the use of regional Health Funding Authorities. 
Their structures, roles and accountabilities vary in each option, but the essential features are: 
1. The HFA’s mission is to plan, commission, fund and regulate the range of health care services that best 
meets the health care needs of the regional population, within the policies and budgets allocated by 
government.  
2. To enable the HFA to focus on this role, it should not have operational responsibility for health care delivery, 
nor should it report to the health department that is responsible for broader government policy. It should 
report to the relevant Minister or Parliament in relation to its performance of its functions, and may be 
established by statute or regulation. 
3. The HFA is made up of a board, appointed by the relevant Minister or Governor-In-Council, with the members 
being selected on the basis of expertise, including knowledge of the region and its health care needs. 
4. The HFA, through its Chief Executive, employs people with skills in health planning, health care, health needs 
assessment, performance monitoring, finance, community and clinician engagement and data management. 
5. The HFA supports and resources networks or other collaborative arrangements among the region’s health 
care providers and representatives of their patients or clients and communities, to enable local approaches to 
integration and coordination of care to be developed, among other benefits. 
6. The work of the HFA is supported by national health policies, standards, research and information, which 
guide its work and ensure national consistency in meeting agreed universal entitlements and standards. 
 
Option 2: States take responsibility 
This option is in many ways the mirror image of Option 1.  
The Commonwealth transfers its share of funding for health and aged care to the states using 
a population needs-based funding formula. That formula is the responsibility of the Grants 
Commission and the funding is possibly encapsulated in a new kind of term-limited Health 
Agreement. A small proportion is retained for funding of national institutions (such as, for 
example, the NHMRC, AIHW and regulatory and national representative bodies). The 
Commonwealth retains roles required by the constitution (for example, health services for 
defence personnel and veterans) as well as its share of the national functions described 
above (policy, intelligence and information, standards, regulation). The Department of Health 
and Ageing continues to exist in a scaled down form, but most functions and staff are 
transferred to states. 
States are responsible for planning, commissioning, funding and local regulation of health and 
aged care services. The budget for MBS, PBS and other Commonwealth funding programs is 
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transferred to the states, but MBS and PBS continue as national patient entitlement, 
categorisation and billing systems. Medicare Australia continues as the payer and processes 
claims on behalf of the states in the same way it now does for the Department of Veteran 
Affairs. The national MBS is retained but could be expanded over time to incorporate other 
types of payments. 
As discussed in more detail in Attachment 2, states are required to meet all MBS and PBS 
claims made by their residents. Over time, states may decide to offer alternative funding 
methods to GPs, pharmacists etc, which they would fund by reallocating unspent funds from 
their MBS and PBS budgets (eg to enable different delivery arrangements in remote areas).  
Table 5: Governance functions in the State option 
Functions Commonwealth States Private/NGO 
Funding Wholesale transfer to states. 
Medicare Australia 
maintained as payment 
agency for states/HFAs 
Fund care delivery and other 
functions 
As is 
Ownership As is States may own but may not 
directly operate hospitals 
and health services 
As is 
Commissioning Broad priority setting and 
facilitation of agreements for 
services that cross state 
borders 
States commission public 
health services 
As is 
Provision As is   Public health care providers 
may be corporatised. States 
contract with a range of 
providers. 
As is, including as 
contracted by state 
health authorities 
Regulation National policy, standards, 
registration, regulation 
State regulation As is 
Other issues There is no incentive for the Commonwealth to maintain growth in its share of 
health funding if all responsibility is transferred to the states. Given predicted 
future needs, this option would only be viable if a strict funding formula for the 
Commonwealth contribution could be agreed.  
 
As with the Commonwealth model, there are two sub-options under the State model, with 
States free to decide which option to adopt.  Either way, they are required to demonstrate that 
the commissioning and providing functions are effectively separated. 
Option 2(a) - the State plans and commissions all health and aged care services   
This is similar to Option 1(a) in the Commonwealth option. 
Option 2(b)  - the states (or at least the larger ones) establish regional Health Funding 
Authorities (HFAs) in order to fulfil the commissioning function 
Under this option, the regional HFAs plan, commission, fund and regulate health care 
providers in their region (within national standards and policies and state plans and budgets). 
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The HFA is a state agency. In states where services are corporatised, the HFA is part of the 
state health department. In states where services are not corporatised, the HFA is a health 
portfolio agency under the relevant state legislation, with legal status similar to that of the 
existing state Health Care Complaints Commissions. This is designed to reduce the conflict of 
interest problem that currently exists for the states as both purchasers and providers. 
As in Option 1(b), for larger states the HFA structure will be better placed to balance provider 
and population interests, both geographically and in terms of population sub-groups. The size 
will need to be sufficiently large to manage and spread risks as well as small enough to allow 
for population planning and informed commissioning. 
HFAs are accountable for health care for the regional population. They commission the full 
range of services from prevention to palliation to improve and maintain the health of the 
regional population. This includes responsibility for building coordination and integration of 
local health services.   
HFAs negotiate contracts for health care provision with local service providers, addressing 
efficiency and volume risks. While the majority of funding is on the basis of outputs (eg 
casemix, MBS), contracts could also be on the basis of population-covered (eg health 
promotion) or funding-for-capacity (eg epidemiological surveillance). 
As with the Commonwealth option, these responsibilities imply the skill mix that will be 
required, much of which already exists in state health departments and in regional and area 
health services. Regardless of whether Option 2(a) or Option 2(b) is selected, the 
commissioning body will require staff with expertise in health needs analysis, health planning 
and contracting. This includes expertise in building relationships and fostering the integration 
of local health services. 
Service provision remains as is or, in the case of state-owned agencies, could be 
corporatised to achieve the separation of commissioning from provision of care. 
As with the Commonwealth option, a key difference between Option 2(a) and Option 2(b) is in 
the flow of funding.  In Option 2(a) funding flows from the state directly to providers either as 
retrospective payments for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or as prospective 
contracts.  In Option 2(b) each region receives a population needs-adjusted share of funding. 
The HFA then uses its regional funding allocation to pay for services rendered (MBS, PBS 
and so on) or to fund prospective contracts. 
The allocation of population based funding to HFAs offers the potential for HFAs to enter into 
arrangements that substitute for the underspending of MBS in some regions resulting from 
the undersupply of doctors and other health professionals (e.g. rural and outer metropolitan 
areas).  Conversely, regions with high utilisation of MBS will potentially be underfunded for 
these service levels. The reconciliation of fee for service programs within population based 
budgets will present particular risks to states (which lack the fiscal capacity of the 
Commonwealth to absorb cost overruns) under this option. In any case, the obligation to 
continue to provide universal access for all Australians to medical services should be 
preserved (by inclusion in the National Health Charter or other means).  
We note that this option could have the potential to ‘let the Commonwealth off the hook’ over 
time. The Commonwealth still needs to be involved because states do not have the tax base 
to allow them to fully take over funding responsibility. The design of arrangements to ensure 
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that the Commonwealth has an incentive to respond to growth in health care needs and 
technical capabilities with increased funding would be a major challenge, given that it would 
no longer have any accountability for health care delivery. One solution would be to use an 
independent indexation-setting body, similar to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) in the USA (MedPAC, 2008). 
 
Option 3: Joint Commonwealth: State Health Commissions 
This option involves the Commonwealth and each of the states establishing a third-party 
health authority to plan and commission health services in the state. Commonwealth and 
state funds for health and aged care are pooled and allocated to the Health Commission.  
Table 6: Governance functions in the Joint Health Commission option 
Functions JHC/s Commonwealth States Private/NGO 
Funding Receive 
pooled C’w 
and state 
funds 
Wholesale to JHC. 
Medicare Australia 
maintained as payment 
agency for JHC/s. 
Wholesale to JHC As is 
Ownership No As is As is or corporatise As is 
Commissioning All commiss- 
ioning 
Broad planning for 
equity and priority 
setting and facilitation of 
agreements for services 
that cross state borders 
State based priority 
setting and planning 
targets  
As is or as 
contracted (eg 
brokerage, care 
coordination) 
Provision No As is Public health care 
provision by states or 
by corporatised public 
agencies, or as 
contracted to private/ 
NGO sector 
As is, or as 
contracted. 
Regulation Of provider 
performance 
National policies and 
standards 
State standards As is or as 
contracted. 
Other issues While both levels of governments will share rather than split accountability to the 
community, transparent decision-making will be critical to prevent the development of 
a new form of blame shifting. 
 
The Health Commission takes responsibility for planning, commissioning, funding and 
regulating the delivery of health and aged care in that state. State and national health 
departments continue to exist in a scaled down form, to fulfil other responsibilities and to act 
as funders and contract managers for the Joint Health Commission, but most staff transfer to 
the Commission. The Commission acts as a board of directors, to whom the CE of the 
Commission reports. The Commission is responsible jointly to the state and to the 
Commonwealth for performance of its functions, and reports to both Ministers or Parliaments. 
Providers remain as they are. States may choose to continue to operate as providers, or to 
corporatise their provider agencies. Medicare Australia retains its national payer role, with a 
national MBS that could be expanded over time to incorporate other types of payments. The 
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national functions outlined above (national health charter, policy, standards, intelligence and 
information, professional registration) are undertaken through AHMC and AHMAC or its 
successor organisations and DoHA. 
As with the previous two options, there are two sub-options under the Health Commission 
model.   
Option 3(a) - the Health Commission plans and commissions all health and aged care 
services for the state 
This is similar to the Commonwealth and state options. 
Option 3(b) - the Health Commissions (or at least those in the larger states) establish 
regional Health Funding Authorities (HFAs) in order to fulfil the commissioning 
function 
Under this option, the HFA is, in effect, a regional office of the Health Commission. As under 
other options, the HFA structure will need to balance provider and population interests, both 
geographically and in terms of population sub-groups. The size will need to be sufficiently 
large to manage and spread risks as well as small enough to allow for population planning 
and informed commissioning. 
The regional HFAs plan, commission, fund and regulate health care providers in their region 
(within national standards and policies and Health Commission plans and budgets).  The skill 
mix required is the same as under the Commonwealth and state options.  
Again, a key difference between Option 3(a) and Option 3(b) is in the flow of funding.  In 
Option 3(a) funding flows from the Health Commission directly to providers either as 
retrospective payments for services rendered (MBS, PBS and so on) or as prospective 
contracts.  In Option 3(b) each region receives a population needs-adjusted share of funding. 
The RFA then uses its regional funding allocation to pay for services rendered (MBS, PBS 
and so on) or to fund prospective contracts. 
We note that under this option, it is difficult to assign clear accountability for health to an 
elected government. That is, the Commission option potentially removes the care delivery 
problems caused by split funding roles, but it may not really resolve the problem of split 
accountability of governments to the community.  
What about a National Health Commission? 
We considered but have not developed a national-level joint Health Commission model for 
fund-holding. The difficulties of coordinating the funds pooling for all states, as well as the 
Commonwealth, and then redistributing the funding, seemed insurmountable. The difficulties 
that the National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) has experienced in achieving this in 
only one area are evidence of the size of this problem. 
It would also appear as too monolithic in a context where some measure of devolution and 
local-level accountability is a more attractive direction. It is also the option which requires 
most attention to the problem of scope – see the Scope section below. 
There may, however, be a role for a National Health Commission as a joint Commonwealth 
and state body responsible for national policy and planning and for setting the national 
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framework within which any of the governance options would operate. This possibility is taken 
up in the Common features section below. 
 
Option 4: Renovate  
Under this option, the existing structures of Commonwealth and state health authorities are 
not radically altered. This ‘renovation’ option might be seen as the end point. Alternatively, it 
might be a development path to one of the other options.  For example, the next round of 
AHCAs might be designed to achieve the renovation option, with a provision to make more 
structural changes which would entrench successful reforms in the subsequent ACHA (2014-
2018).  
Either way, the focus is on developing better specification and some ‘teeth’ for accountability 
(financial and public reporting measures), and the incremental development of reform in high 
priority areas. In this option, the parties agree on a case by case basis to pool funds or shift 
accountabilities in three major categories of reform: 
 assigning accountabilities for service performance in specific areas to one level of 
government. This option has already been proposed by the Commission in its first report 
and was summarised above. As outlined in the Commission’s first report, the assignment 
of accountabilities does not imply an immediate transfer of functions between 
governments. Nor does it imply that financial responsibility would fall on only one level of 
government. Rather, these arrangements would be designed so that each level of 
government carries clear political (and bureaucratic) accountability for meeting the 
public’s expectations in specific areas of health service delivery. Under such an 
arrangement, failure to achieve performance benchmarks could result in both financial 
penalties and political consequences. As one example, the Commonwealth could be 
exposed to the costs that hospitals incur in meeting the needs of people with chronic 
disease who could have been treated in the primary care sector. The technology to 
identify admissions in this category and measure the incidence would need to be 
developed, but this is technically feasible. It would reduce the perverse incentives for both 
levels of government arising from the current splits in responsibility. 
 better integration or coordination of care for specific populations (such as the frail aged, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and others living in remote 
communities as well as those with specified conditions).  
 the reform of governance and funding arrangements for specific sectors or for specific 
functions of the care delivery system.  Examples of these might include primary health 
care, mental health, aged care or information and communication technologies (ICT). 
As these categories imply, some of these renovation options may involve fine-tuning while 
others would constitute more fundamental reform of a specific aspect of health care.  
Fee-for-service remains the dominant mode of payment for general practice and private 
specialist care, and the Primary Care Strategy adjusts arrangements for payment for allied 
health services, and related changes in the gate-keeping role of GPs.  Over time, the parties 
could agree to changes in the funding for primary care designed to enhance the 
comprehensiveness and accessibility of care, such as per capita payments for enrolled 
populations with high primary care needs. Other opportunities for renovation are identified 
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over time through existing structures such as AHMC and AHMAC and through current 
national initiatives including the work of the NHHRC, the National Prevention Taskforce, the 
Primary Care Strategy and so on. 
Under these arrangements, the Commonwealth could, for example, make agreements with 
individual states to take over financial responsibility for all care of those older people and 
people with disabilities who have high care needs. Equally, the Commonwealth could move to 
simplify its own funding programs, in addition to the current work to reduce the number of 
Specific Purpose Payments to the states. 
This option is intended to enable preparation for transition to more fundamental reform, based 
on the results of incremental change as outlined above. A significant reworking of the 
Australian Health Care Agreements is the main immediate instrument to enable this option. 
Such new AHCA’s will need to include commitments to reform in high priority areas and to the 
goal of moving to single-point accountability. Clearer incentives and sanctions to reinforce the 
accountability of both the Commonwealth and the states for achievement against the agreed 
reform agenda will also be needed. The next AHCA’s would then be designed to achieve the 
renovation option, with a provision to make more structural changes which would entrench 
successful reforms in the subsequent ACHA (2014-2018).  
But there is no need under the renovation option for reform initiatives to be limited to those 
agreed in a five year health agreement. Renovations can occur whenever the Commonwealth 
and the relevant state agree on a required reform. Likewise, the Commonwealth can also take 
unilateral action for major reform in those areas where it currently has responsibility such as 
reform of the primary health care program. This process could enable testing of options to 
achieve single point accountability.  
Strong policy leadership and sustained cooperation among health authorities will be required. 
The flexibility for different developments in different jurisdictions is a potential strength, but 
remains dependant on Commonwealth preparedness to accommodate such flexibility. 
Commonwealth and state health authorities will necessarily be the main negotiators of such 
changes. However, it may be helpful to open up the negotiation process because those 
working in the health authorities have a conflict of interest when changes in health authority 
roles are on the table. 
The five governance functions are shared more or less as is, as summarised in Table 7 
below. 
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Table 7: Governance functions in the renovation option 
Functions Commonwealth States Private/NGO 
Funding Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with one or more states 
Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with the Commonwealth 
As is 
Ownership Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with one or more states 
Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with the Commonwealth 
As is 
Commissioning Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with one or more states 
Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with the Commonwealth 
As is 
Provision Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with one or more states 
Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with the Commonwealth 
As is 
Regulation Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with one or more states 
Status quo except as agreed 
jointly with the Commonwealth 
As is 
Other issues This is an attractive option in being relatively less threatening to existing interests 
and arrangements, and enabling potential structural change to be tested 
incrementally. The down-side is a perception that the promise of the reform process 
in the end may amount to simply ‘more of the same’. 
 
Common features 
In developing the options above, it became apparent that some functions and features did not 
change between options: 
A national health charter 
Regardless of the option selected, there should be a national statement of entitlement, 
signifying that all Australians will have access to certain agreed forms and standards of care. 
The statement should be developed over time, based on a combination of knowledge about 
what works, and agreement that it should be available to all. We would suggest it start with 
such basic measures as universal mother and baby health care, access to primary clinical 
care, and support for people with disabilities including those caused by ageing. It should 
incorporate a statement that gives more concrete shape to the concept of ‘people and family 
centred care’. Such a statement could be an important foundation for the health system’s 
response to the call to close the health gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians. Responsibility for developing and maintaining the national health charter could be 
taken by an existing body like the NHMRC or the AIHW, or a new body (perhaps a National 
Health Commission) could be established for this purpose. It should be accountable to AHMC 
or its equivalent. 
National policy and planning        
In all options, capacity for national policy-making and planning should be sustained under the 
auspices of AHMC and AHMAC or its successors. High priority policy areas, for example, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health or mental health, could be nationally specified and 
their budgets and service arrangements protected. Further, regardless of the option adopted, 
there will be a need for ongoing reform and development of the health system once the work 
of the current Commission is completed. That ongoing development needs to be undertaken 
under the auspices of AHMC and AHMAC or its successors. 
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National health intelligence and 
information  Funding of Indigenous Primary Health Care 
The current problems in governance of the Australian health 
system are magnified in the funding and regulation of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander health care. In particular: 
1. The fee-for-service funding of general practice and pharmacy 
care contributes to access problems (especially but not only in 
rural and remote areas). Indigenous people aren’t able to get 
anything like a ‘fair share’ of MBS- and PBS-funded services 
(Deeble et al, 1998; Dwyer, Silburn and Wilson, 2004). 
2. Efforts to pool funds between the Commonwealth and states 
are impeded by all the problems of multiple players with different 
agendas and priorities, so that good intentions and good ideas 
like the Primary Health Care Access Program (PHCAP) fail in 
implementation. 
3. Dollar for dollar, Indigenous health care providers face a 
heavier burden of managing multiple contracts and complying 
with multiple reporting requirements than other primary care 
providers (Source: unpublished Victorian data). 
For these and many other reasons, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people use less primary care, and experience higher 
rates of hospitalisation, than any other group. This could change 
if Commonwealth and state governments could agree on a 
workable role definition, resolve the arguments about who pays 
for what, and implement a new approach in partnership with 
communities. 
Australia is well served by some 
of its national health institutions, 
and given its size could be well 
served by national strategies in 
important areas like information 
and communication technology 
for health. National health data 
are improving, and governance 
change should disrupt this 
progress as little as possible. 
National regulation 
Similarly, we need to sustain our 
capacity to standardise some 
regulatory arrangements across 
the country, such as the Aged 
Care Accreditation and Standards 
Agency, and nationally 
harmonised registration of health 
professionals.  
Regional planning and delivery 
In all of the options above, we 
suggest that there must be the 
option for better regional 
coordination and planning of 
health care delivery. The 
questions of the size of regions, and their relationship to state boundaries, vary under various 
options. Regions could carry specified accountability and budgets for national policy priority 
areas (like mental health). 
Strengthen primary health care and improve the integration of ‘health’ and ‘aged’ care 
There is a critical need to strengthen primary health care. Likewise, there is an urgent need 
for better integration in the planning and financing of ‘health’ and ‘aged’ care to stop the cost 
and blame shifting that now occurs and to improve the coordination of care for those with 
chronic health needs.  These two problems need fixing under any option. See Attachment 3 
for a more detailed discussion of the impact of the options for primary health care. 
Change is a process 
Change should be staged, and higher level enabling measures should be put in place first, so 
that those closer to patient care and community needs are supported to enhance the 
effectiveness of their work, while also being able to continue care delivery with a minimum of 
disruption. 
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Scope 
There are important problems with defining the scope of health and aged care reform –  
problems of policy and the problem of current jurisdictional variations in the scope their health 
or human service portfolios. The policy problem is that, for example, services for people with 
disability and for families and children need their own high level focus, and can suffer from 
being ‘bundled up’ with the relatively larger health and aged care sector.  
Currently, jurisdictions vary widely in their portfolio arrangements. Victoria, Tasmania and the 
Northern Territory have existing broader boundaries on their human service authorities – 
including variously housing, family and community services. Similarly, ambulance services 
are not included in the health portfolio in some states, but rather in emergency services.  
Likewise, prison health services may be part of the health portfolio or part of the justice 
portfolio.   
Jurisdictions may choose to take the opportunity of health and aged care reform to realign 
portfolios. However, requirements for portfolio changes can be largely avoided in all options 
(the national Joint Health Commission is perhaps the exception, but we have rejected this 
option for this and other reasons). The departments with larger scope already manage 
multiple joint agreements and the equivalent of this arrangement could continue. 
Private and non-government sectors  
This paper raises several issues of relevance to the private and non-government sectors, in 
particular, their roles in providing health and aged care, and possibly in acting as contracted 
purchasers. In this section, we briefly address the implications for the private and non-
government sectors, noting that the Commission has commissioned a separate paper which 
canvasses existing and potential roles for the private sector more fully. 
Private health insurance (PHI) 
The role of PHI does not need to change under any of the options.  However, the NHHRC is 
separately considering the role of PHI and, in that context, there are a number of possibilities. 
One option is the potential for PHI to act as purchaser/commissioner for its members on some 
form of ‘cash out’ basis, for example, the funding of care packages for identified patient 
groups in relation to chronic and complex care.  As noted above, such an approach would be 
possible under all of the options in this paper.  
Private hospitals 
The role of private hospitals is not necessarily changed by any of the options, but under all 
options, private hospitals could become more involved in providing care for public patients or 
for responding to contracting opportunities to provide a broader range of care.  
Non government organisations 
There is an enormous array of non-government organisations involved in health care 
provision, from large national church-based hospital groups to local support services for those 
with a specific condition. Their roles are not necessarily changed by any of the options, but 
more effective commissioning and transparency of funding will enhance their opportunity to 
participate and to contribute to local health solutions involving new models of care. In 
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addition, better tendering and contract management practices have the potential to improve 
both efficiency and responsiveness of the care provided by NGOs. 
Chronic and Complex Care 
As we have already noted, the current health system works well for episodic care, but less so 
for those with complex chronic conditions. Most of the solutions lie outside hospitals and 
many involve private and non-government providers. Under all options, there is potential for 
private and non-government providers to take on care coordination roles for an enrolled 
population.   
Private Sector Participation in System Governance 
Under the current arrangements, while private providers and funders are a major part of the 
health system, they do not have a place at the table in national governance forums such as 
AHMC or COAG. These groups are rather regarded as stakeholders who need to be 
managed through the political process. Private/non-government health and aged care entities 
primarily relate to the system governance structures as lobbyists, and as industry and 
professional associations.  
Priority areas for system redesign include care coordination outside hospitals as well as the 
creation of an effective interface between hospital and community based care. 
Commonwealth/state arrangements cannot address the care delivery aspects of these 
changes, as the community based providers are largely private. The private sector needs to 
play an active role in system redesign, and it could be argued that it therefore needs a larger 
role in system governance.  
The various structural options outlined in this paper assume that with the separation of 
commissioning and delivery there will be greater opportunities for local participation and 
integration by private providers at the local level. 
The question remains as to whether there should be provision in national, state and regional 
governance arrangements for these private participants (provider organisations, professional 
associations, industry bodies and private health insurers) to contribute their expertise.  In 
Germany, for example, the Concerted Action model seeks to engage all participants in the 
reform process (Gross, 2008).  
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Conclusions: Can we get there from here? 
We have outlined the problems, assumptions, principles and design considerations which 
formed the basis of our thinking, and have outlined four distinct feasible options.  
We have not expressed a view about which is the best option, and to do so is not our role. 
However, we have reflected long and hard about the major problems to be solved, the 
potential for change, and the attendant risks. We would offer the following thoughts for 
consideration by those who will make decisions about these critical matters. 
1. System design is not a set of free choices  
Elements must be aligned: policies, funding arrangements, skills, roles and accountabilities 
come as a linked set, and each element affects all the other elements in sometimes 
unpredictable ways. The need for change arises precisely because of the current lack of such 
alignment. Whatever is done in future must achieve better alignment and cannot run the risk 
of being perceived as just a continuation of business as usual. 
2. Incrementalism is an enduring feature of Australian public policy  
The most achievable pathway may be what we have called the renovation option. It could be 
adopted explicitly as a transitional arrangement, and we have attempted to outline the main 
features in a way that would enable this strategy. However, we cannot honestly suggest that 
the continuation of the kind of split responsibility the system currently endures is a platform for 
improved accountability and more effective governance. If this option is adopted, it should 
include provision to begin experimenting with integrated responsibility for those sectors of 
care which most urgently require change, that is, improvement in health care for Indigenous 
Australians, and ongoing care for people with complex and chronic conditions. 
3. Whatever the governance option, there is room for simplification in the current 
plethora of funding programs at all levels of government  
This could be undertaken through sophisticated methods of harmonising payment 
arrangements regardless of source. The same harmonisation strategy could be adopted for 
accelerating changes to reporting and information sharing arrangements. That is, change 
could happen in the funding and information management ‘back room’ that would move the 
blame- and cost-shifting borders away from patients and care providers and minimise, if not 
resolve, the care delivery problems they cause. 
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Attachment 1: Technical Issues 
As well as setting out two primary questions for this paper, the National Health and Hospitals 
Reform Commission asked us to consider a number of technical issues, only some of which 
we have addressed above. We give further brief responses to each below. 
 
1. Purchasing 
The Commission noted that ‘the purchasing function is relatively poorly developed and to the 
extent that it exists, has been associated with the evolution of more sophisticated ways of 
funding (eg through casemix funding arrangements) with attention to more detailed 
specification of the range of services to be purchased being limited to some specialised 
areas.  The paper should identify whether a more sophisticated purchasing function should be 
encouraged to evolve in Australia and if so, what might be the benefits of this policy direction, 
the feasibility of this and impediments to the development of such a strategy.   The options 
paper should also identify the merits or otherwise of a clearer separation of 
funding/purchasing and provision in the Australian health system.’ 
We have addressed the commissioning function in the body of this paper. In relation to 
technical purchasing options, it is not currently feasible to replicate the sophisticated definition 
and costing of hospital episodes in other parts of the health system.  Even if a significant 
development investment is made tomorrow, it would be many years before an episode-based 
(rather than item-based) classification and costing system would be possible.  That said, we 
note that health authorities working with providers have developed sophisticated service 
models and used them as the basis for payment regimes in areas of policy focus, including 
mental health and disability care. Other opportunities have been lost, including the potential to 
gather more useful health intelligence from GP and specialist billing codes (eg the description 
of services as ‘short’ ‘medium’ or ‘long’ consultation is no basis for developing an episode 
based classification and funding model).   
We suggest that better specification of funded care, and better information about utilisation of 
services, should be pursued selectively, where technical means and policy importance 
combine to provide opportunity for benefit. 
 
2. Funding for accountability 
The Commission suggested that there are two broad choices in methods of funding for 
accountability: ‘to emphasise area funding or activity-based funding (or both).  Some 
canvassing of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach should be undertaken.  Here 
the paper needs to consider issues both in terms of how public sector services might be best 
structured, but also structures, governance and accountability arrangements might evolve in 
the context of so-called ‘funds pooling’ options.’ 
This paper has focused on arrangements for the governance and accountability of 
government, rather than providers of care. We suggest that both area or population-based 
funding and activity-based funding are important and valid methods for accountability, and 
that the choice of method depends on the policy goal, the level at which the funding is flowing 
and the alignment of the delivery system. For example, area-based funding is more effective 
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when one organisation has authority over most of the services in the area, or at least 
coherent packages of services while activity-based funding is more appropriate for the 
funding of specific services such as a hospital.  While activity-based funding promotes 
technical efficiency, population-based funding promotes allocative efficiency. For this reason, 
models that contain elements of both, if well-designed, have the potential to contain the best 
incentives. 
 
3. Integration of organisational structures 
‘States differ in terms of whether public institutional provision is integrated at an area level 
and whether hospitals are organisationally distinct entities from other health services.  
Discussion about the merit or otherwise of integrated organisational structures should be 
included in the options paper.’ 
We are mindful of the extent to which restructuring of public health care institutions has been 
a cyclical and very expensive exercise over the last 15 years. We also note that almost all 
public sector organisations (ie the health authorities of most states and many organisations 
within Victoria) are larger and/or operate with less effective delegation of operational authority 
than the evidence from research on organisations indicates is feasible or desirable. We would 
therefore suggest that restructuring of public health care organisations be undertaken only 
when there is a strong basis of need to do so, and that it should move either in the direction of 
reduction in size or enhancement of the strategy known as ‘divisionalising’ in large 
corporations (ie operational autonomy for different product or service lines within a large 
organisation).  The general principle should be to decentralise what you can and only 
centralise what you have to. 
 
4. Breadth of health authority roles 
‘Jurisdictions also differ in terms of the scope of their health authority’s responsibilities (e.g. 
some ‘Human Services’ departments are responsible for much more than health services).  
Although primarily determined by whole of government considerations as part of machinery of 
government changes, some comment should be included in the options paper on whether a 
broader range of functions has merit in terms of taking the claimed comprehensive view of 
health and the range of appropriate health interventions, set against the added complexity of 
management of the Department and span of control issues.’ 
We have briefly addressed this question in the section headed ‘Scope’. 
 
5. The role of Boards 
‘If a funder/purchaser versus provider split is proposed, the options paper should canvas 
whether such a split necessitates the introduction of boards of directors of the provider 
organisations.  The strengths and weaknesses of boards in the health sector, their role, and 
the nature of any autonomy that should be accorded to boards should be canvassed.’  
Australia has had two types of boards, hospital and community health centre boards and area 
health boards.  Hospital and community health centre boards have been historically 
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responsible for managing the budget allocated by government.  Area health boards were 
historically responsible for improving the health of residents in a designated geographic area 
and, to that end, were also responsible for the management of health services. Area Health 
Boards, particularly in NSW under the Area Health Services Act 1986, had real governance 
authority and accountability. Movement away from models offering a measure of geographic 
area responsibility and devolved funding (through a series of amalgamations) has occurred in 
recent years (except in Victoria) because of perceived administrative and political difficulties 
rather than health policy or efficiency concerns. Given the plethora of administrative changes 
in recent years, we take the view that boards should only be reinstated with appropriate 
authority guaranteed or in the fully realised form of corporatisation.  
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Attachment 2: Improving equity of access to MBS and 
PBS 
While current fee for service arrangements work well for some, there is significant inequity 
across the country in relation to geographic access to these schemes. These inequities 
largely reflect the geographic maldistribution of the medical workforce, both between and 
within states and territories. In this short attachment, we explore a single proposition – that is, 
that better geographic equity of access to medical care could be achieved through a shift to 
population needs-based funding while still using MBS and PBS as payment mechanisms. 
This analysis does not address overall geographic equity, so that, while it appears from this 
analysis that residents in some states use more MBS and PBS funded services than others, 
analysis of other sectors of the health system (for example, hospitals and mental health 
services) would produce different results. 
Table 8 illustrates current inequities at the level of the states and territories. With average 
benefits of $1,010 per person in 2007/08, NSW residents received $80 per year more benefits 
from these two schemes than the national average. At the other extreme, NT residents 
received $508 less. The differences are even more extreme when per capita benefits are 
examined at the level of urban, regional and remote region of residence. 
Table 8: Per capita MBS and PBS funding by state and territory 2007/2008 
Jurisdiction MBS and PBS per capita Per capita difference from national average 
NSW $1,010 $80 
SA $957 $27 
VIC $941 $11 
TAS $909 -$21 
QLD $892 -$38 
WA $787 -$143 
ACT $739 -$191 
NT $423 -$508 
Australia $930 $0 
Source: Medicare Australia (MBS and PBS data) and ABS (population data) 
In discussing the options for reform and renovation, we noted that needs-based funding to 
regions is critical to achieving better geographic equity. This short attachment summarises 
how this might be achieved. 
It would be neither possible nor desirable to simply reduce MBS and PBS funding in NSW, 
South Australia and Victoria and redistribute it to the other states. Both schemes are designed 
to be universal schemes and Australians are entitled to access them wherever they live 
(presuming that they are available). Further, there is no evidence to suggest that those states 
enjoying benefits above the national average are ‘over-serviced’. Indeed, the Commission is 
receiving significant input suggesting that increased investment in primary care will be 
required to meet Australia’s future needs.  
Instead, achievement of geographic equity whether via regional HFAs or by other means will 
require increased investment over time. While regional HFAs would initially be established by 
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cashing out the region’s current level of benefits (with the majority of funds continuing to be 
paid as fee-for-service benefits through MBS and PBS), funding for those regions below 
needs-adjusted per capita share would gradually be increased (potentially over some years) 
to an equitable level.  
Table 9 illustrates the potential cost of increasing per capita benefits across the country to the 
level of that enjoyed in NSW. In total, MBS and PBS benefits would need to increase by $1.7 
billion or 8.6%. This represents an increase in total health spending of around 1.8%, which is 
well within the growth rate in health expenditure experienced in recent years. It is thus a 
feasible option. It is important to note that any actual adjustments would be balanced by 
adjustments in expenditures on other programs, which may also account for some of the 
variability between states in population take up of MBS and PBS. Also, within-state variations 
are in many cases more significant, and will need to be addressed at regional level under any 
option if equity of access is to be improved. 
Table 9: Investment required to achieve equity (unadjusted for need) between 
the states in MBS and PBS funding (2007/08 dollars) 
Jurisdiction $ required to increase MBS and PBS to NSW level % increase
NSW $0 0%
SA $84,125,206 5.5%
VIC $359,910,356 7.3%
TAS $49,767,845 11.0%
QLD $496,545,915 13.2%
WA $473,919,055 28.2%
ACT $92,209,318 36.6%
NT $127,777,533 139.0%
Australia $1,686,577,811 8.6%
 
Within their regional allocation, each HFA would be required to continue to cover the costs of 
universal access to both the MBS and the PBS for their residents. This is essential to 
maintain the rights of citizens to access these services. But if a region is underspent (e.g, 
because of the undersupply of doctors and other health professionals in rural and outer 
metropolitan areas), the HFA could enter into arrangements to develop new models of care 
that substitute for the underspending. Conversely, regions with high utilisation of MBS/PBS 
could potentially be underfunded for these service levels, but only if growth in MBS and PBS 
funding is not maintained.  
Either way, there would be no requirement for the HFA to ‘silo’ their MBS or PBS funding. The 
HFA will have access to a global allocation for their region’s residents that includes not only 
MBS and PBS funding but also, for example, funding for hospital and other services. Within 
this global allocation, the HFA is charged with responsibility for funding the range of services 
required to meet the health needs of their residents. In doing so, they will need to take 
account of population need, the requirement to maintain the universality of Medicare, the 
range and mix of services already in place, opportunities for service substitution and new 
models of care. 
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Attachment 3: What the options mean for primary 
health care 
This section provides just one example (primary health care) to illustrate what the options 
mean in practice. Primary health care services are first point of contact services that do not 
require a referral from another health professional. They include, but are not limited to, GPs, 
community health, home and community care, maternal and child health, community mental 
health, aged care assessment teams, aboriginal community-controlled health services, 
dentisty, optometry, other allied health services. 
Under Option 1, primary health care services would be funded and either reimbursed or 
commissioned by the Commonwealth. Under Option 2, primary health care services would be 
funded from a funding pool that includes both Commonwealth and state contributions, but 
they would be reimbursed or commissioned by the state. Under Option 3, they would also be 
funded from a funding pool that includes both Commonwealth and state contributions but 
would be reimbursed or commissioned by a joint Health Commission. Under all options, 
individual out-of-packet payments for services would continue to apply, unless alternative 
decisions were made to allocate public funding or change health insurance scope. 
To successfully meet Australia’s future needs, the level/s of government given responsibility 
for primary health care services in the future will need (among other challenges) to: 
 increase the size and mix of the primary health care workforce 
 achieve a more equitable geographic distribution of the primary health care workforce 
 develop and implement funding models that achieve the right balance between fee for 
service, capitation, salary, funding for capacity and funding for performance 
 use available incentives and levers to achieve better planning, coordination and 
integration of primary health care services 
 use available incentives and levers to achieve better linkages between primary health 
care services and other parts of the health system, including incentives to keep the 
population healthy and thus reduce reliance on acute care hospitals and residential care. 
These challenges are summarised in Table 10 along with brief comments about the options 
set out in this paper. 
Table 10: Reform priorities for primary health care 
Challenge Comment 
Workforce Attention to future workforce supply and roles is needed regardless of the option. 
There is no evidence to suggest that any particular option will better support 
workforce supply and distribution. However, the Commonwealth has the deepest 
pocket and the best opportunity to shape the volume and mix of health 
professionals graduating from Australian universities  
Equity The states have a better (although somewhat patchy) track record on this issue. 
Needs-based funding to regions is critical to achieving better equity regardless of 
the structural option 
Funding models While there is no doubt an ongoing place for fee for service payments, it is equally 
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Challenge Comment 
true that fee for service alone is not an adequate funding model for primary health 
care. There are opportunities under all options for better blended and mixed 
payment models similar to those in place in other countries (eg, the funding of 
New Zealand Primary Health Organisations)  
Planning and 
coordination within 
primary health 
care 
More comprehensive, and more effective, local solutions are required. All 
integration is local and thus regional structures are essential, regardless of the 
structural option. The states have a better (but again somewhat patchy) track 
record on this issue. 
Planning and 
coordination with 
other parts of the 
health system 
This requires both effective funding levers and local planning and coordination 
structures and processes. There are opportunities under all options that involve 
regional HFAs for better planning and coordination of services on a regional and 
local basis. It is doubtful that this could be achieved under any of the centralised 
options 
 
As this brief summary illustrates, a change in the corporate governance of the health system 
(regardless of the option selected) will not, by itself, solve the problems confronting primary 
health care, just as none of the options immediately solve the problems confronting other 
sectors. Each of the options creates opportunities (in different ways) to removes barriers, set 
directions and change the way that resources are allocated. The key question is to design the 
governance structure that is most likely to allow these challenges to be addressed. 
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